

Iraqi Perspectives Project A View Of Operation Iraqi Freedom From Saddams Senior Leadership

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Explore the 'Iraqi Perspectives Project,' offering a unique and critical view of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This invaluable resource delves into the thoughts, strategies, and experiences directly from Saddam Hussein's senior leadership, providing unprecedented insights into the Iraq War from an insider's perspective.

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Iraqi Perspectives Project. A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership

Iraq's response to the Coalition's military threat was dictated by the nature of the regime and of Saddam Hussein himself. While to Western eyes the choices Iraq made may appear dysfunctional or even absurd, the regime's responses to the threat and then the invasion were logical within the Iraqi political framework, even if later proven to be counterproductive. Saddam may have been, to a large extent, ignorant of the external world; he was, however, a student of his own nation's history and culture. Thus, the Iraqi response to threats and the invasion of Coalition forces was a function of how Saddam and his minions understood their own world, a world that looked nothing like the assessments of Western analysts. As the massive buildup of coalition forces proceeded in 2002 and early 2003, two major assumptions governed Saddam's preparations. The first assumption was that the greatest danger the regime faced was an internal coup. In fact, Iraq's national history is littered with military coup attempts with one following another in dreary progression. Even Saddam's Ba'ath Party saw its first try at seizing power in the early 1960's collapse under the hammer blow of a military coup that overthrew the first efforts of the Ba'ath party to mold Iraq in accordance with its ideology. In response to the catastrophic defeat of Arab armies by Israel in the Six Day War, another military coup ushered the Ba'ath return to power on July 17, 1968, with Saddam as one of its leading players. Saddam and his colleagues were determined that this time the military would not overthrow their new Ba'ath regime, and created a multitude of secret police organizations to ensure the unswerving loyalty of the population. These secret agencies immediately proceeded to infiltrate the military in order to ensure its loyalty.

Iraqi Perspectives Project

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) overthrew Saddam's regime and opened up one of the world's most secretive governments to outside analysis, presenting a once-in-a-generation opportunity for military leaders and historians to delve deep into the decision-making processes of a former adversary. For the first time since a similar project at the end of World War II, we have an opportunity to evaluate military

events from not only our own vantage point but also from the perspective of the opposing political and military leadership. Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani originated this vital and interesting work when he was Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). As part of a major effort to ensure we fully understood the lessons of OIF, he commissioned a comprehensive analysis of US strengths and weaknesses. This first-of-its-kind venture was led by Brigadier General Robert W. Cone, the then-Director of USJFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (JCOA). Almost as soon as this effort got underway in the spring of 2003, Admiral Giambastiani realized that the study would not be complete unless information about what drove the Iraqis to make the decisions they did was fully integrated into the analysis. To accomplish this, project leader Kevin Woods led a small team of professionals in a systematic two-year study of the former Iraqi regime and military. This book is the first major product of that effort. It presents a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drove our opponent's decisions through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents. Kevin and his team have crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process. Moreover, it goes a long way towards revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders' point of view. Presented herein is crucial information currently missing from still ongoing analyses of OIF, and much of its content will counter currently accepted wisdom. While the practice of self-critique and gathering lessons learned are distinguishing features of the US military, in almost every past instance our understanding of events remained incomplete because any assessment was limited to a "blue" only view of the situation. While we often had a relatively complete picture of what our adversary did, we remained in the dark as to what motivated his actions. At the conclusion of past conflicts, we were left to speculate which of our actions were causing specific enemy responses and why. Expert analysts and "red team" assessments attempt to make this speculation as informed as possible, but because of the impenetrability of closed regimes, even their usefulness is somewhat limited. In this case, however, by adding the actual "red team's view" to the compilation of multiple, differing viewpoints, this study hopes to contribute to a more fully developed history of the war, and allow all concerned to get closer to "ground truth." General Lance Smith, the current USJFCOM Commander, and the JCOA team remain committed to this and similar projects as part of an ongoing process of learning and improving through the sharing of "ground truth." Though this project is an important initial step, we acknowledge the history of OIF is far from complete. Researchers continue to locate, translate, and analyze information that will shed new light on our former adversary's perspective of the conflict. It is in the interest of getting as much accurate information as possible into the hands of those already studying Operation Iraqi Freedom that we release this book.

Iraqi Perspectives Project

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Iraqi Perspectives Project

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime opened up one of the world's most secretive governments to outside analysis. This text takes advantage of the opportunity to observe Saddam's decision-making processes and to see the move towards war from the Iraqi side.

The Iraqi Perspectives Report

The purpose of the Iraqi Perspectives Project is to provide the national security community with new insights concerning the long confrontation with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. This study represents a unique look at Operation Desert Storm and the events precipitating it from the perspective of Iraq's senior leadership. Events in this story of the "Mother of All Battles" (as Saddam designated the war) are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, video tapes, audio tapes, maps, and photographs, all captured by U.S. forces in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to making the Iraqi perspective available to more analysts, the narrative in this study lends itself to four general purposes: critical analysis, improving historical accuracy, red team development, and a study of adaptation. In support of U.S. Joint Forces Command's ongoing mission to develop operational lessons, this effort will help future warfighters and planners better understand the events of 1990 and 1991 as they wrestle with the challenges of today.

Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II. Um Al-Ma'arik (The Mother of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective, Volume 1 (Revised May 2008).

During the 2003 war that ended Saddam Hussein's regime, coalition forces captured thousands of hours of secret recordings of meetings, phone calls and conferences. Originally prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, this study presents annotated transcripts of Iraqi audio recordings of meetings between Saddam Hussein and his inner circle. The Saddam Tapes, along with the much larger digital collection of captured records at the National Defense University's Conflict Records Research Center, will provide researchers with important insights into the inner workings of the regime and, it is hoped, the nature of authoritarian regimes more generally. The collection has implications for a range of historical questions. How did Saddam react to the pressures of his wars? How did he manage the Machiavellian world he created? How did he react to the signals and actions of the international community on matters of war and peace? Was there a difference between the public and the private Saddam on critical matters of state? A close examination of this material in the context of events and other available evidence will address these and other questions.

The Saddam Tapes

Includes detailed and edited transcripts of interviews with General Hamdani as well as a summary of insights as interpreted by the interviewers.

Saddam's War

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The Saddam Tapes

These were Major General Mizher Rashid al-Tarfa al-Ubaydi, a senior officer and section leader in Iraq's military intelligence service dealing with Iran during the conflict; Major General (ret) Aladdin Hussein Makki Khamas, corps chief of staff, division commander, and director of Iraq's Combat Development Directorate during the war; Lieutenant General Abid Mohammed al-Kabi, commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Navy from 1982 to 1988; and Major General 'Alwan Hassoun 'Alwan al-Abousi, a squadron and wing commander during the conflict. As a result of these interviews, the Project 1946 team deepened and extended its understanding of a number of aspects and incidents during the period.

Saddam's Generals

How did the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime look from the Iraqi perspective? That question triggered the Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP), sponsored by U.S. Joint Forces Command and the National Intelligence Council. The effort was named "Project 1946" inspired by the methodology used by U.S. Army historians and intelligence officers working with former members of the German General Staff to develop an understanding of World War II from the German perspective. This McNair Paper covers a broad spectrum of Middle Eastern military history through the eyes of Iraqi Lieutenant General Ra'ad Hamdani, who held various command positions in the 1980-1988 war and, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanded the II Republican Guard Corps. Contents: Part One * Summary and Analysis * General Comments * The Arab-Israeli Wars and the rise of the Ba'ath Party * Between the 1973 War and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) * The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) * Thoughts on the Iran-Iraq "Cold-War" in the 1990s * Comments on * Part Two * The Interviews * Discussion One * Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 * Military Transition under Ba'athist Rule * Discussion Two * Iraqi Military and Political Transition through the 1970s * Prologue to Iran-Iraq War * Transition of Iranian Leadership and Military * Decision to Invade * Saddam's Aspirations * Earliest Phase of the War * Political and Professional Soldiers * Disorganized Command and Control of Iranian Operations * Discussion Three * Early Use of Air Power * SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] * Winter 1980-1981 Iraqi Command Changes * Saddam's Response to Failure and Executions * 1980-1982 Losses and Army Expansions * Developments of Iranian and Iraqi Forces * Discussion Four * Saddam's Psychology and Personality Development * January 1981 Armor Battle * Iranian Human Wave Tactics and Iraqi Minefields * Khomeini's Spiritual Influence * Battles of Abadan and Khorramshahr * Loss of Special Forces * End of Initial Iraqi Offensives in May 1981 * Discussion Five * 1981-1982 Turbulence in Tehran * Iranian Infiltration Tactics * 1982 Attacks around Basra * 1984-1988 Marsh Infiltrations and Iraqi Engineering Efforts * International Support to Iran * Chemical Weapons Usage * Iranian Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction * Postwar Preparations with WMD * 1982-1983 Reorganization and Recruiting for Republican Guard * Psychological Support of Saddam to Troops * Postwar Republican Guard Reorganization * Discussion Six * Summer 1983 Iranian Offensive into Haj Umran * Northern Mountain Operations and Kurdish Support * A 1,000-kilometer Front * Threats to the Dams and Baghdad * Unpredictable Iranian Strategy and Tactics * February 1984 Iraqi 6th Armored Division Losses * Iranian Marsh Operations * Intelligence Development and Satellite Support in March 1985 * Discussion Seven * 1986 Al-Fao Campaign and Baghdad's Misinterpretation of Iranian Strategy * Traitors in the Iraqi Leadership * Prisoners of War * Operation Dawn * Iraqi Casualty Competition and the "Bedouin Mentality" * Discussion Eight * Republican Guard Expansion and the Response to Al-Fao * Hussein Kamel * General Hamdani's Command Obstacles * 1987 Iranian Attack on Basra and Casualty Inflation * Shalamjah: The Somme of the Iran-Iraq War * Hamdani's Venture through the Front and the Battlefield Conditions * Discussion Nine * July 1987 Republican Guard Command Changes * Battlefield Missiles * Halabjah * Factors of Post-1987 Shift in "Correlation of Forces" toward Iraq-Planning Effort for Al-Fao Offensive * Use of Helicopters * Front of 1988 * July 1988 Iraqi Incursion through to Ahvaz and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq * Discussion Ten * Foundations of the Iraqi Military and Saddam's Detrimental Influence * Hamdani's Effort to Improve Iraqi Military Culture * Questioning Military Orders and Planning * Lessons Learned from the Iran-Iraq War * Fight to Follow the War and Saddam's Perception of Victory and Warfare * Discussion Eleven * Stories of War Heroes

Saddam's War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War

Includes detailed and edited transcripts of interviews with General Hamdani as well as a summary of insights as interpreted by the interviewers.

Saddam's War: an Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War - Saddam Hussein As Political and Military Leader, Ba'ath Party, Chemical Weapons, WMD, Iranian Strategy, Republican Guard

This study was inspired by post-World War II efforts of U.S. Army historians and intelligence officers to gather and preserve insights and perspectives of the German General Staff. This is the second volume in a series of studies, sponsored by the National Intelligence Council, designed to cast light on issues involving Saddam's Iraq by interviewing former Iraqi officials. The first volume, *Saddam's War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War*, contained interviews with Lieutenant General Ra'ad Hamdani, a former Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commander. This second volume includes an additional interview with Hamdani, along with four additional senior officers who discuss issues including Iraqi naval operations, airpower, military intelligence, and capability development.

Saddam's War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War

Events in this story of the "Mother of All Battles," as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, video and audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime's archives and never intended for outsiders' eyes. The book is part of an official U.S. Joint Forces Command research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary's archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, the author's balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of his unique access to material. The result is a completely unknown but fully documented view from the other side.

Saddam's Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War

Research brief summarizes an analysis of information derived from interviews with former senior Iraqi officials to determine factors contributing to the rapid collapse of Iraqi resistance to the Coalition invasion of Iraq in March and April 2003.

Saddam is Iraq

A comprehensive account of the Iran-Iraq War through the lens of the Iraqi regime and its senior military commanders.

Saddam's Generals

Summarizes a report on the planning and execution of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM through June 2004. Recommends changes to Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and Title 10 functions.

Saddam's War

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT-- OVERSTOCK SALE - Significantly reduces list price Prepared by Institute for Defense Analyses under Contract DASW01-04-C-003 Task ET-8-2579 "Study on Military History (Project 1946 - Phase II)" for the National Intelligence Council. Prepared in cooperation with the Conflict Records Research Center. Contains copyrighted material. This monograph represents a continuation of a series of research efforts designed to extend the knowledge of the contemporary Middle East, military history, and Iraqi military effectiveness during the course of three major wars: the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This second volume is based on interviews with figures significant in the Iran-Iraq War, extensive examination and study of captured Iraqi records, and a review of secondary sources. The interviews presented here involve not only lengthy discussions with Lieutenant General Ra'ad Majid Rashid al-Hamdani, staff officer and battalion commander during the Iran-Iraq War, whom the Project 1946 research team had interviewed before, but similar types of discussions with a number of senior Iraqi military leaders who played key parts in the Iran-Iraq War. Related products: *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005* can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-00989-9> *The Iranian Puzzle Piece: Understanding Iran In The Global Context* is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01591-1> *All Roads Lead To Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces In Iraq*, New Chapter in America's Global War on Terrorism -Print Paperback format is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-070-00801-7> *Saddam Hussein's Nuclear Vision: An Atomic Shield*

and Sword for Conquest -Print Paperback format can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01044-7>"

The Mother of All Battles

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein's regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction. The focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to helping the Gov't. of Iraq improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. This report addresses these policy issues: Identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and Laying the groundwork for a traditional bilateral relationship. Map. A print on demand report.

Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion was So Weak

Den amerikanske hærs første officielle historiske beretning om operationerne i den anden Irakiske Krig, "Operation Iraqi Freedom"

The Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War is one of the largest, yet least documented conflicts in the history of the Middle East. Drawing from an extensive cache of captured Iraqi government records, this book is the first comprehensive military and strategic account of the war through the lens of the Iraqi regime and its senior military commanders. It explores the rationale and decision-making processes that drove the Iraqis as they grappled with challenges that, at times, threatened their existence. Beginning with the bizarre lack of planning by the Iraqis in their invasion of Iran, the authors reveal Saddam's desperate attempts to improve the competence of an officer corps that he had purged to safeguard its loyalty to his tyranny, and then to weather the storm of suicidal attacks by Iranian religious revolutionaries. This is a unique and important contribution to our understanding of the history of war and the contemporary Middle East.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

An overview of air power's history and effectiveness, by the top experts in the field

Saddam's Generals

The aftermath of the war in Iraq has generated a great deal of second-guessing regarding Washington's prewar planning and intelligence efforts. Gregory Hooker, senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at U.S. Central Command, provides a detailed narrative of the war planning process, beginning with the military's initial attempts to adjust to the new focus on regime change and closing with the government's ineffective preparation for the postwar environment.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Choice Outstanding Academic Title of 2016 Investigates the causes, conduct, and consequences of the recent American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Understanding the United States' wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is essential to understanding the United States in the first decade of the new millennium and beyond. These wars were pivotal to American foreign policy and international relations. They were expensive: in lives, in treasure, and in reputation. They raised critical ethical and legal questions; they provoked debates over policy, strategy, and war-planning; they helped to shape American domestic politics. And they highlighted a profound division among the American people: While more than two million Americans served in Iraq and Afghanistan, many in multiple deployments, the vast majority of Americans and their families remained untouched by and frequently barely aware of the wars conducted in their name, far from American shores, in regions about which they know little. Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gives us the first book-length expert historical analysis of these wars. It shows us how they began, what they teach us about the limits of the American military and diplomacy, and who fought them. It examines the lessons and legacies of wars whose outcomes may not be clear for decades. In 1945 few Americans could imagine that the country would be locked in a Cold War with the Soviet Union for decades; fewer could imagine how history would paint the era. Understanding

the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan begins to come to grips with the period when America became enmeshed in a succession of “low intensity” conflicts in the Middle East.

On Point

This book studies force, the coercive application of power against resistance, building from Thomas Hobbes’ observation that all self-contained political orders have some ultimate authority that uses force to both dispense justice and to defend the polity against its enemies. This cross-disciplinary analysis finds that rulers concentrate force through cooperation, conveyance, and comprehension, applying common principles across history. Those ways aim to keep foes from concerting their actions, or by eliminating the trust that should bind them. In short, they make enemies afraid to cooperate, and now they are doing so in cyberspace as well.

The Iran-Iraq War

Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.

A History of Air Warfare

In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival—but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In *Coercion, Survival and War* Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.

Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom

Authors Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, experts on Middle East history and politics, have combined their expertise to write what is largely considered the definitive work of one of the world's most reviled and notorious figures. Drawing on a wealth of Iraqi, Arab, Western and Israeli sources, including interviews with people who have had close contact with Saddam Hussein throughout his career, the authors trace the meteoric transformation of an ardent nationalist and obscure Ba'th party member into an absolute dictator. Skillfully interweaving a realistic analysis of Gulf politics and history, and now including a new introduction and epilogue, this authoritative biography is essential for understanding the mind of a modern tyrant.

Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

"Based on a unique set of interviews and British and American documents, this book examines the motives for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, examines the decision-making inside the Bush administration, and assesses the reasons for the chaotic, bloody, and costly occupation. The attack on America on 9/11 by al Qaeda terrorists transformed the thinking and actions of Bush and his top advisers. Bush conceived the administration's response. Fear, power, and hubris shaped his approach - fear of another attack; pride in American values; and confidence in America's ability to effectuate change. Worried about another attack on American soil - this time with biological or chemical weapons - Bush turned his attention to Iraq because of Saddam Hussein's history with weapons of mass destruction and because of his record of aggression, brutality, and duplicity. To achieve his goals, the American president embraced a strategy of coercive diplomacy. If Iraq faced a military threat,

Bush hoped Hussein would open his country to inspections, relinquish his alleged weapons of mass destruction, flee, or be toppled. When Hussein admitted inspectors yet remained obstructive, Bush denounced the dictator's defiance and believed America's credibility was at stake. Without resolving the ambiguities and inconsistencies in his strategy of coercive diplomacy and failing to assess the consequences of an invasion or to plan effectively for its many contingencies, Bush ordered U.S. troops to invade Iraq. Friction and acrimony within the administration turned the occupation into a tragedy, the consequences of which we are still living with"--

The Use of Force for State Power

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating. Command in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In *The Politics of Command*, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of eleven vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and towards civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates. Freedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives. Freedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.

Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)

The move away from post-Cold War unipolarity and the rise of revisionist states like Russia and China pose a rapidly escalating and confounding threat for the liberal international order. In *Iraq against the World*, Samuel Helfont offers a new narrative of Iraqi foreign policy after the 1991 Gulf War to argue that Saddam Hussein executed a political warfare campaign that facilitated this disturbance to global norms. Following the Gulf War, the UN imposed sanctions and inspections on the Iraqi state--conditions that Saddam Hussein was in no position to challenge militarily or through traditional diplomacy. Hussein did, however, wage an influence campaign designed to break the unity of the UN Security Council. The Iraqis helped to impede emerging norms of international cooperation and prodded potentially revisionist states to act on latent inclinations to undermine a liberal post-Cold War order. Drawing on internal files from the ruling Ba'th Party, Helfont highlights previously unknown Iraqi foreign policy strategies, including the prominent use of influence operations and manipulative statesmanship. He traces Ba'thist operations around the globe--from the streets of New York and Stockholm, to the mosques of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to the halls of power in Paris and Moscow. Iraqi Ba'thists carried out espionage, planted stories in the foreign press, established overt and covert relations with various political parties, and attempted to silence anyone who disrupted their preferred political narrative. They presented themselves simply as Iraqis concerned about the suffering of their friends and families in their home country, and, consequently, were able to assemble a loose political coalition that was unknowingly being employed to meet Iraq's strategic goals. This, in turn, divided Western states and weakened norms of cooperation and consensus toward rules-based solutions to international disputes, causing significant damage to liberal internationalism and the institutions that were supposed to underpin it. A powerful reconsideration of the history of Iraqi foreign policy in the 1990s and the early 2000s, *Iraq against the World* offers new insights into the evolution of the post-Cold War order.

Coercion, Survival, and War

The Bush Doctrine is dead! At least that's what critics hope. But while new U.S. national security challenges emerge, many post-9/11 threats still persist and the policies of George W. Bush offer one set of strategic answers for how President Obama can confront those dangers. Neither a polemic nor a whitewash, this book provides a careful analysis of the Bush Doctrine—its development, application, and rationale—and assesses its legacy: How will Obama respond to the many foreign policy challenges that await him? Through an examination of psychology as much as policy, Renshon gives us the first comparative analysis of the Bush Doctrine and the developing Obama Doctrine. The book analyzes the range of national security issues Obama will face and the political divisions that permeate U.S. national security debates. It is essential reading for anyone looking to understand how presidents assess security risks generally and how Obama specifically is likely to adapt the Bush Doctrine to his own worldview.

Saddam Hussein

Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq as a dictator for nearly a quarter century before the fall of his regime in 2003. Using the Ba'th party as his organ of meta-control, he built a broad base of support throughout Iraqi state and society. Why did millions participate in his government, parrot his propaganda, and otherwise support his regime when doing so often required betraying their families, communities, and beliefs? Why did the "Husseini Ba'thist" system prove so durable through uprisings, two wars, and United Nations sanctions? Drawing from a wealth of documents discovered at the Ba'th party's central headquarters in Baghdad following the US-led invasion in 2003, *The Ba'thification of Iraq* analyzes how Hussein and the party inculcated loyalty in the population. Through a grand strategy of "Ba'thification," Faust argues that Hussein mixed classic totalitarian means with distinctly Iraqi methods to transform state, social, and cultural institutions into Ba'thist entities, and the public and private choices Iraqis made into tests of their political loyalty. Focusing not only on ways in which Iraqis obeyed, but also how they resisted, and using comparative examples from Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, *The Ba'thification of Iraq* explores fundamental questions about the roles that ideology and culture, institutions and administrative practices, and rewards and punishments play in any political system.

Confronting Saddam Hussein

"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb,' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes."—from *Living Weapons*

Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In *Living Weapons*, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare. Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments. *Living Weapons* draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened.

Command

The almost universally accepted explanation for the Iraq War is very clear and consistent - the US decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003 was a product of the ideological agenda, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President George W.

Bush and prominent 'neoconservatives' and 'unilateralists' on his national security team. Despite the widespread appeal of this version of history, Frank P. Harvey argues that it remains an unsubstantiated assertion and an underdeveloped argument without a logical foundation. His book aims to provide a historically grounded account of the events and strategies which pushed the US-UK coalition towards war. The analysis is based on both factual and counterfactual evidence, combines causal mechanisms derived from multiple levels of analysis and ultimately confirms the role of path dependence and momentum as a much stronger explanation for the sequence of decisions that led to war.

Iraq Against the World

This volume provides a collection of insightful essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba'athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency. Written by leading scholars on the Iraq War, many of whom have practical first-hand experience of the war, the book includes a Conclusion by leading US strategic thinker Eliot Cohen. This is the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side of the war, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives. War in Iraq will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies in general.

National Security in the Obama Administration

The Ba'thification of Iraq